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Philip Fearnside (1998) raises the by now well-known issue of how to assess
climate-change induced changes in human mortality. Others did so before (e.g.,
Hohmeyer, 1996; Massood, 1995; Meyer, 1995; Pearce, 1995), and we have par-
ticipated in the ensuing debate with a series of articles (e.g. Fankhauseret al., 1997,
1998). A thorough discussion of this delicate issue is important, though, and we are
grateful for the opportunity to respond to Fearnside’s comments.
Fearnside puts forward a new way of dealing with mortality risks. He proposes
to report climate change impacts as $ X + N deaths. This would presumably imply
decision making on the basis of a simple form of multi-criteria analysis. Some
analysts may feel more comfortable within this framework. But in our opinion it
ducks the issue. The issue is whether we should spend $ Y on emission abatement
to avoid some of the N deaths, and how these avoided deaths compare to $ Y not
spent on education, health care, or luxury cars.
Making judgements on this issue – we would argue – requires a careful trade-off
between the pros and cons of the suggested course of action. To assure transparency
in this trade-off, accountability for the decision taken, and consistency with deci-
sions on other projects, the trade-off has to be made as explicit as possible. This
requires quantification of all aspects, and expression of them in a common metric.
Fearnside’s suggestion does not provide this. Economists typically use money as
they common metric. This is simply a choice of convenience, however. There is
nothing deeper to it.
Unfortunately, Fearnside’s note also repeats some of the misconceptions of the
earlier debate. In particular he completely misreads what is actually meant by the
term ‘value of a statistical life’. Nobody, not even economists, would try to value
the ‘pain [people feel] on losing their loved ones’. What we can do, however, is
observe, and learn from, the risks people take in their every day lives. The dif-
ference is crucial. We neither valued life as such, nor were values ‘decided by
researchers’ as Fearnside claims. The values of a statistical life used in our and
similar work is based on empiricial studies of how people value safety themselves.
This is consistent with the belief of most economists that social decisions should
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be based on individual preferences. Estimates were derived from the preferences
revealed by large groups of economic actors, for example when they buy safety
equipment, or accept occupational hazard in return for a higher pay.
People’s willingness to accept compensation for a higher risk is a function of
their income. This is a fact of life, as are, unfortunately, large income differences.
The values of a statistical life used by us and others reflect this reality. Thus, a risk
to a poor person is valued less than the same risk to a rich person.∗ One may find
this objectionable, but what one actually objects to in this case is the underlying
distribution of income. We, too, object to that. But we also think that fighting
causes is better than fighting symptoms. Tinkering with revealed preferences will
not improve the plight of the poor – in fact overestimating the value of statistical
lives could even lead to an undesirable reallocation of funds away from poverty
alleviation. There are better ways of redistributing income than via global warming.
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∗ Consequently, risk to future people are valued higher than risks to current people. Fearnside
mistakenly interpreted our article to suggest that therefore future studies of climate change impacts
would arrive at higher estimates.
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